Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments pro…le is observed. When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investments pro…le is observed, we assume that bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game in one case and according to a Dictator Game in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it supports an homogeneous behavior in the whole population both at the investment stage and at the distribution stage. A norm of investment and a norm of division must therefore coevolve in the two games, supporting both the e¢ cient investment pro…le and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The two games differ depending on the conditions needed for the two norms to coevolve. The games are proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.
Introduction
In this paper we study a two-stage game with two risk-neutral players in which a production phase precedes a division phase. In stage one both players have to simultaneously decide whether to invest or not; in stage two, after observing the gross surplus produced, they have to decide how to divide it. The game has a multiplicity of equilibria; players thus face a serious equilibrium selection problem which may nevertheless be solved if adequate social norms are in place (Binmore, 1998 (Binmore, , 2007 Binmore and Shaked, 2010) . Since in our model agents strategically interact in each stage of the game, the social norm of interest is twofold: it is a norm of cooperation, which dictates how to play the production stage, and a norm of distribution, which dictates how to divide the surplus produced. Examples of social norms of this kind can be found in the anthropological literature on cooperative food acquisition and cooperative hunting in modern hunter-gatherer societies. For instance the Ache of Paraguay developed a rule of thumb for hunted resources of the kind "cooperate frequently and share fully" (Hill, 2002) ; a similar conclusion, related to whale hunters in Lamelera, is drawn by Alvard and Nolin (2002) . The observed compliance to these rules of thumb by several hunter-gatherers has led some social scientists to suggest that these norms must have been evolving over time, probably as a way to regulate large-game hunting (Bohem, 2004) . Our goal is to explore whether and under what conditions social norms supporting both an e¢ cient outcome and neat distributional rule can endogenously arise through an evolutionary process.
We assume that the investment is costly and, to simplify the analysis, that the cost is the same for both agents. The surplus depends on the investment pro…le. We further assume that when nobody invests no surplus is produced and both agents receive nothing. Thus, a bargaining stage only occurs when at least one agent has invested in the …rst stage.
Two di¤erent extensive games, corresponding to two di¤erent structures of political and social organization, are considered. In both extensive games we assume that when the two players have chosen to invest the bargaining stage follows the rule of the Nash Demand Game (NDG). When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investment pro…le is observed two simple alternatives are considered. Each of these speci…es how the unique investing agent can reap the rewards of her own action.
In the …rst alternative we assume that the sociopolitical organization promotes full right of possession. As a consequence all the bargaining power is assigned to the player who has decided to invest; by allowing her to behave as a dictator, the bargaining stage then collapses into a Dictator Game (DG). In this framework if a sharing occurs it only depends on the free will of the unique investing agent. In the second alternative we assume that the sociopolitical organization recognizes a right to sharing by asking an agreement across agents as condition to gather the surplus. However the agreement has to emerge in a situation in which, due to the recognized right, the bargaining power is asymmetric. This suggests that bargaining can take the form of an Ultimatum Game (UG) in which the player who has chosen to invest proposes a distribution which is only realized if the opponent accepts it otherwise the surplus is lost due to (unspeci…ed) con ‡ict. By DG (resp. U G ), we denote the whole game in which an NDG occurs when a symmetric investment pro…le is observed, and a DG (resp. UG) occurs when an asymmetric investment pro…le is observed. Both games ( DG and U G ) have a multiplicity of equilibria.
The anthropological literature suggests that DG can be appropriate in a society in which production is a collective venture and property rights are secured, as it seems to happen among the Mbuti pygmies (Ichikawa, 1983) ; on the other hand U G can be suitable for a society in which production is an individual activity but in which full right of possession is not supported, as it seems to be the case for the !Kung (Woodburn, 1982) .
In order to identify the evolved social norms we use the concept of stochastic stability and we apply the evolutionary framework for extensive games put forward by Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) . We claim that a social norm has evolved when the stochastically stable set only supports an homogeneous behavior for at least one population. Our main result states that in both games (i.e. U G and DG ) when a social norm evolves then not only do we observe an homogeneous behavior along the whole path of play but the prescribed actions are uniform across populations. We can thus claim that in both games the norms coevolve; in this case the investment norm supports full cooperation in the production stage (meaning that both agents choose to invest) and the bargaining norm entails an egalitarian division of the realized surplus. The two games di¤er depending on the conditions needed for the two norms to coevolve. In particular we always observe a coevolution of norms in DG whereas in U G this only occurs when investments are complements and the cost of investment is not too high; when these conditions fail a great deal of outcomes are stochastically stable so that neither an investment norm nor a bargaining norm evolve.
Our main results are derived under the natural assumption that full cooperation in the production stage is e¢ cient; this means that the net surplus observed when both agents choose to invest is greater than the net surplus when only one invests. Recently Avard (2004) advanced the hypothesis that norms of cooperation and norms of fair division were more likely to be observed in societies in which "the payo¤s to cooperation are high". In order to verify Alvard's hypothesis, in the last Section we very brie ‡y extend our analysis to the case in which full cooperation in the production stage is not e¢ cient and we show that our results do not change.
The basic model is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes evolutionary dynamics and gives some preliminary results. The main results are provided in Section 5, and further insights are discussed in Section 6. In the next Section 2 we brie ‡y relate our model to the relevant literature.
2 Relation to literature Troger (2002) , Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and MacLeod (2001, 2008) investigate the consequences of evolutionary dynamics in scenarios characterized by investment speci…city 3 . Broadly speaking this literature has shown that evolution (i.e. stochastic stability) may or may not support an e¢ cient investment pro…le depending on whether only one (Troger, 2002; Ellingsen and Robles, 2002) or both parties (Dawid and MacLeod, 2008 ) make a relationspeci…c investment in the project, respectively. However any further comparisons between these models is hindered by the fact that the games structure is rather di¤erent.
In particular, Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and Troger (2002) consider the case in which total output is determined by the decision of one agent only and the bargaining proceeds according to the rule of NDG. They have shown that all the stochastically stable equilibria are e¢ cient and that a neat distributive norm evolves virtually assigning all the surplus to the investor provided that a …ne grid of possible investments is allowed. When the size of the pie is endogenous, the aforementioned papers have proved an important result, namely that separating the analysis of the bargaining stage from the prior investment stage is illegitimate in the context of the hold-up literature. Dawid and MacLeod (2001) is the contribution closer to our model. They consider a two-stage game with two-sided relation-speci…c investment and show that the e¢ ciency result proved by Ellingsen and Robles (2002) and Troger (2002) may not extend to this case. However in our opinion their way of shaping the distribution stage is rather critical. Indeed they assume that equal split occurs after a symmetric investment pro…le while a bargaining game, which follows the rule of the NDG, only occurs after an asymmetric investment pro…le. We argue that, though the equal split at symmetric investment pro…le may be an adequate hypothesis, it sweeps away the main issue namely the origin of this social norms when total surplus depends on previous investment decisions 4 . When instead an asymmetric investment pro…le is observed, the assumption that they haggle according to the rule of NDG is tantamount to assume a structure of individual preferences more biased towards free-riding demeanor; although this assumption can be adequate in some context we contend its general validity.
These assumptions, coupled with the considered evolutionary dynamics, make the whole model unsuitable for studying the evolution of a bargaining norm; this follows directly from the fact that, although in Dawid and MacLeod (2001) bargaining only occurs when asymmetric investment pro…les are observed, no limit set supporting this asymmetric pro…le exists under their unperturbed dynamics. 5 Dawid and MacLeod (2008) is a further extension in which 3 We say that investment is completely relation-speci…c when it is only valuable to a particular trading partner. It is well known that investment speci…city, making the investor vulnerable to ex-post exploitation, may give rise to the so-called hold-up problem. 4 When the size of pie is exogenously given Young (1993) has shown that equal split emerges as bargaining norm. 5 The evolutionary dynamics they use are an adaptation of Young (1993a) to extensive the outcome of the investment decision is stochastic. They show that (i) the bargaining norm a¤ects the investment norms but the opposite is not true; (ii) the problem of under investment is stricter when investments are complements.
As we said, this literature is concerned with (one-sided or two-sided) relationspeci…c investment. By contrast our main interest is to study a generic setting in which people are not dependent on speci…c other people for access to basic requirements and in which individuals are not bound to …xed assets or …xed resources. This makes our model more apt for describing simple societies as modern hunter-gatherers (Woodburn, 1982) , for instance. Notwithstanding, if some scholar want to apply our models to two-sided relation-speci…c investment then we suggest to consider U G only. In fact, it is only in this game that the single agent who has invested is vulnerable to ex-post exploitation. 6 It is worth noting that, although the formal conditions for a stochastically stable outcome to exist in U G coincide with those required by Dawid and MacLeod (2001) , the basic models and evolutionary dynamics are di¤erent. In particular, while in U G these conditions support the coevolution of a norm of investment and a norm of distribution, they only uphold a norm of investment in Dawid and MacLeod (2001) .
The model
In this Section we describe strategic environments; in the next, these will be embedded in an evolutionary framework. Two risk neutral players (A and B) are engaged in a two stage game. In stage one, both have to simultaneously decide whether to invest (action H) or not (action L); when a player chooses H she incurs cost c. A surplus is produced and observed at the end of stage one; each player can then correctly estimate her opponent's investment. We denote the surplus arising when both choose H by V H ; the surplus accruing when only one chooses H by V M ; and lastly, when both choose L, by V L = 0. Obviously,
In stage two, they bargain over the available surplus. The bargaining rule depends on the investment pro…le. If both have chosen H, they are engaged in form games. Although this extension is not problematic with one sided investment (as in Troger, 2002) , it is a bit tricky with two sided relation-speci…c investment since it can imply that some agents can continue to believe that all the opponents make the same investment (i.e. all choose high or low investments) even when some bargaining outcomes (which in their model can only happen when high-low matches occur) are observed. 6 Ellingsen and Robles (2002) also considered the case in which, in stage two, the distribution of the surplus is determined by an ultimatum game where the player who makes the proposal is the trading partner, i.e. the agent not responsible for the investment decision. They have shown that in this case the stochastic stability has little cutting power because many outcomes are stochastically stable. Our game U G mainly di¤ers from Ellingsen and Robles (2002) in two respects. First, the player who makes the proposal is the player who decided to invest in the …rst stage. Second, since both agents can decide to invest, both can be in a position to a¤ect the distribution of the surplus generated by the other. Our result for U G says that, under the appropriate conditions, a unique stochastically stable outcome exists.
a Nash Demand Game (NDG). If they have chosen di¤erent investments, two alternatives are conceivable: an Ultimatum Game (UG) and a Dictator Game (DG). We denote U G the whole extensive game in which a NDG occurs when both players have invested while a UG occurs when only one player has invested. Analogously we denote DG the whole extensive game in which a DG occurs when only one agent has invested. 7 Let D (V j ) = f ; 2 ; :::; V j g ; j 2 fH; M g denote the set of feasible claims.
Throughout the paper we consider a class of games in which the following Assumption holds:
2 and c are divisible by and c > ; (b) the e¢ cient net surplus arises when both players choose H, i.e.
(c) the maximum payo¤ attainable by playing H when the opponent chooses L is not negative, i.e.
In NDG, both players simultaneously make y and x demands. If the demands are compatible, each receives what she claimed; otherwise they receive nothing. When both choose H, the payo¤s are In UG the player who has chosen H makes a proposal that the opponent can either accept or reject. Let's suppose HL is observed and A proposes the division (y; V M y). If B accepts, the payo¤s are y c for A and V M y for B; otherwise A gets c and B nothing.
In DG, the player who has chosen H decides a division her opponent cannot reject. Suppose HL is observed and A demands y: The payo¤s are y c for A and V M y for B.
It is worth noting that, under Assumption 1, both U G and DG admit a subgame perfect equilibrium which supports investment pro…le HH. Nevertheless, both games admit a great deal of subgame perfect equilibria some of which are ine¢ cient.
Evolutionary dynamics
In this Section we consider the evolutionary dynamics put forward by Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) . To this end we postulate a …nite population of size N for each player, A and B. In each period, every possible match between agents occurs meaning that each agent belonging to population A interacts with each agent of population B, one at a time. An agent is described by a characteristic which consists of a detailed plan of action and a set of beliefs concerning the choice and the demands made by opponents in the …rst stage and in the second stage respectively. In U G , a plan of action for player A must specify: (i) the type of investment; (ii) the demand when both players choose H (the action at HH); (iii) the demand when A chooses H and B chooses L (the action at HL); (iv) whether to accept or reject any demands made by B, when in the …rst stage B chooses H and A chooses L. The same applies for player B. In DG , a plan of action for player A must specify: (i) the type of investment; (ii) the demand when both players choose H (the action at HH); (iii) the division of the surplus when A chooses H and B chooses L (the action at HL). The same applies for player B. A state, ; is a pro…le of characteristics of the overall population. z ( ) is the probability distribution across terminal nodes, given the state of the population . The set of possible states, ; is …nite.
At the end of every period each agent with probability observes z( ) and her characteristic may change: In particular the received information allows agents to correctly update their beliefs on opponent's choices at the observed information sets. Given their new beliefs, they also update their action pro…le by choosing a best reply 8 at each information set. With probability 1 the single agent does not observe z ( ) and her characteristic does not change. This learning mechanism engenders an (unperturbed) Markov process ( ; P ) where P is the transition matrix on . By we denote a generic limit set 9 of the process; this is a minimal subset of states such that, when the process enters, it does not exit. By ( ) we denote the set of observable terminal nodes under . Lastly by we denote the union of the limit sets of the process .
Besides being updated, agents' beliefs and actions can also change by mutation. In every period, each agent has a probability of mutating. Mutations are independently distributed across agents. When mutating, agent changes her characteristic according to a probability distribution assigning positive probability on each possible characteristic.
A particular type of mutation occurs when the mutants change belief and/or action at some unreached information set under the current state . In this case we assert that the state drifts. 8 However if the learning agent has already played a best reply her action does not change. Moreover when the best reply contains more than one action, one of these can be randomly chosen according to a distribution with full support. 9 A set is called a limit set of the process ( ; P ) if: (a) 8 2
Mutations generate a new (perturbed) Markov process ( ; P ( )) ; which is ergodic. It is well known that, for any …xed > 0; the perturbed process has a unique invariant distribution . Let = lim !0 denote the limit distribution. A state is stochastically stable if ( ) > 0: We denote the set of stochastically stable states by S ; this is the set of states which has a positive probability in limit distribution. Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) proved that the stochastically stable set is contained in the union of the limit sets of the unperturbed process. In order to detect the stochastically stable set we …rst have to characterize the limit sets of our model; this is the aim of the following two Propositions.
Proposition 2 In U G all the limit sets have one of the following structures: (a) they contain one state only, and this is a self-con…rming equilibrium of the game; (b) they contain more than one state and all investment pro…les are observed. Moreover, only one outcome is realized for each investment pro…le in which the claims exhaust the surplus.
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Proof. See the Appendix Proposition 3 In DG all the limit sets contain one state only, and this is a self-con…rming equilibrium. Moreover, at least one agent chooses to invest at every equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix
From now on when we speak of equilibrium we refer to self-con…rming equilibrium.
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Propositions 2 and 3 state that the considered evolutionary dynamic gives rise to a large multiplicity of limit sets. However, this dynamic admits limit sets in which both investment and bargaining behavior is uniform in each population. It is thus likely that homogeneous behavior in one or both populations could be molded by evolution. When this happens, we say that a norm has evolved. Accordingly, an investment norm has evolved if all agents belonging to the same population make the same investment and the investment behavior is correctly anticipated . Analogously, a bargaining norm has evolved if a pair of demands (y; x) exists at some reached information set which exhausts the gross surplus and the bargaining behavior is correctly anticipated. When the set of stochastically stable states contains only equilibria supporting the same outcome we speak of a stochastically stable outcome rather than a stochastically stable set.
Despite the fact that Propositions 2 and 3 do not help to pin down which behavior is more likely to become the conventional one, in the next Section we shall show that the stochastically stable set can support only one outcome in both games. Our remarkable result stems from direct application of Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) and Ellison (2000) . In particular, Proposition 1 of Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) states that if S is a strictly subset of (i.e. S ) then a = 2 S can not be reached from S by a sequence of single-mutation transitions. Hence, our …rst task (Lemma 4 and 5 below) is to detect the smallest b such that a sequence of a single-mutation transitions is enough to escape from any 2 n b and reach b . In this case when S we know that S b . From now on, by slightly abusing notation, (HH; y HH ; x HH ) denotes a terminal node in which both agents have chosen H, agent A makes a demand y HH and agent B makes a demand x HH . This applies for the other terminal nodes, too. The next Lemma states our …rst preliminary result, which holds true for both the extensive games considered Lemma 4 Consider a limit set such that ( ) is not a singleton. An equilibrium supporting one outcome only can be reached from by a sequence of single-mutation transitions.
Proof. See the Appendix. Lemma 4 enables us to limit our attention to the equilibria supporting one outcome only. According to the investment pro…le observed, we can partition this set of equilibria into four subsets. We note these subsets respectively as H ; L ; HL and LH : Of course, H includes all the equilibria supporting the outcome fHH; V H x HH ; x HH g where x HH 2 D (V H ) : The same applies for the other subsets. The following Lemma 5 highlights that the process can move from any equilibrium belonging to the set ( L [ HL [ LH ) to a new equilibrium 2 H through a sequence of single-mutation transitions.
Lemma 5 Consider an equilibrium ; then:
(a) if 2 L an equilibrium 0 2 H can be reached from by a sequence of single-mutation transitions provided that c + < x HH < V H c ; (b) if 2 HL (resp. LH ) an equilibrium 0 2 H can be reached from by a sequence of of single-mutation transitions provided that c + < x HH < V H c .
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is worth stressing that since subset L is empty in DG , then only point (b) of the previous Lemma is relevant to this game.
Lastly Lemma 6 below asserts that in U G a sequence of single-mutation transitions is enough to shift the process from any equilibrium 2 L to a new equilibrium 0 in which only one agent has invested.
Lemma 6 Consider U G and an equilibrium 2 L then an equilibrium 0 2
LH [ HL can be reached from by a sequence of single-mutation transitions provided that at 0 the agent who has chosen H is better o¤ ;
All the results so far obtained only require that c min V M ;
: From Lemma 4 we know that, when a limit set underpins a multiplicity of outcomes, then we can reach an equilibrium sustaining only one outcome by a sequence of single mutations. Lemma 5 tells us that if the single equilibrium outcome does not support the e¢ cient investment pro…le, then the process can reach a single equilibrium belonging to H by a sequence of single mutations. Hence, when S , both these Lemma suggest we focus on subset H .
Main results
The conclusion of the previous Section suggests we limit our concern to the set of equilibria H for both games. In this Section we show that when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it always supports the e¢ cient investment pro…le and the egalitarian distribution rule.
In this Section, we introduce a further technical assumption.
Assumption 7
The population is su¢ ciently large, i.e.
First and foremost, we provide a characterization of the stochastically stable set for U G ; we then brie ‡y consider DG . A number of further de…nitions are needed: By x B (resp. V H x A ) we denote the share going to player B (resp. A), such that she receives a payo¤ equal to (V M ) when both agents have invested:
Since c is divisible by and c > ;
Under assumption (3) it follows that b
When this condition holds, then we can de…ne the following set:
It is worth noticing that
meaning that in IH the lowest share of surplus is the same for both agents. Few computations show that
By de…nition when 2 IH each agent receives an equilibrium payo¤ not smaller than the maximum payo¤ attainable when she deviates by playing L. Any equilibrium in IH thus dominates all the equilibria supporting other investment pro…les. Hence even if at an equilibrium 2 IH the belief on the outcome in high-low matches drifts, allowing some agents to expect to get almost the whole surplus if they do not invest, this drift does not push the process away from the basin of attraction of :
The next Lemma 8 shows that both IH and CH have some desirable features.
a) under condition (6) more than one mutation is needed to escape from IH ; (b) one mutation is enough to escape from CH and to reach L ; (c) under condition (6) ; IH can be reached from 2 CH by a sequence of single mutations:
The next Proposition states our main result for U G : In order to derive this Proposition, we make use of both the su¢ cient condition developed by Ellison (2000) and some of the results for the NDG proved by Young (1993) . c then a stochastically stable outcome exists. In this case all agents choose to invest and the surplus is equally split. Proof. See the Appendix Proposition 9 holds provided that the set IH includes at least one equilibrium, condition satis…ed when (6) holds. According to Dawid and MacLeod (2008) , the investments are complements if the marginal e¤ect of action H when the opponent always plays H is greater than the marginal e¤ect of action H when the opponent plays L. Since in our model V L = 0; this condition is met when V M < 1 2 V H . This in turn implies that only the e¢ cient investment pro…le HH supports a Pareto dominant equilibrium when is su¢ ciently small. Sure enough when IH is not empty investments are complements in the sense of Dawid and MacLeod (2001) , but investments can be complements in the sense of Dawid and MacLeod also when IH is not well de…ned.
We now turn to the case in which a Dictator Game (instead of an Ultimatum Game) is played when an asymmetric investment pro…le is reached. Lemma 10 below points out a desirable propriety for some equilibria belonging to H : Lemma 10 Consider DG and let be an equilibrium belonging to H . When, at , the distribution rule satis…es the following condition
then more than one mutation is needed in order to reach an equilibrium supporting a di¤ erent set of outcomes.
Proof. see the Appendix
Lemma 10 suggests that also for DG we can identify a subset of H with the property that more than one mutation is required to escape from it. As before we denote this subset by D IH . The same argument used above shows that D IH is well de…ned when
Consequently, when is su¢ ciently small and the rules of the game give all the bargaining power to the only agent who has played H, then no further assumptions on the cost of investment are needed in order to argue that the most e¢ cient investment norm evolves in the long run. The following Proposition summarizes our …nding concerning DG .
Proposition 11
Consider DG : If is su¢ ciently small and c V M then a stochastically stable outcome always exists and it supports full investment and the egalitarian distributional rule. even when condition (6) does not hold. This implies that for whatever beliefs o¤ the path (i.e. at HL and/or LH) the process still sustains the outcome HH;
In particular, suppose that in period t the process is at an e¢ cient equilibrium in which the surplus is equally split but condition (6) does not hold. Let one B agent expect to get almost the whole surplus if she does not invest. In period t + 1 she will not invest. However, since at HL all A agents behave like a dictator, they will get almost the whole surplus. Hence in period t + 2 ; by letting all B agents revise, they all will choose to invest. Therefore the process does not leave the basin of attraction of :
Discussion
In this Section, we provide further insights into our results. First consider U G . Borrowing from anthropological literature, we have suggested that this game is more apt for describing the evolution of investment and distribution norms when full rights of possession are not socially supported. Proposition 9 describes the scenarios we can expect to observe over the long run in a society of this kind 14 .
First, either a norm of investment and a norm of bargaining coevolve, or no norm evolves at all. Second, when norms coevolve, they support e¢ cient investment and egalitarian distribution. However, we can expect norms to coevolve when investments are complements (i.e. V M < 1 2 V H ) and the investment cost is su¢ ciently low (c < V H 2 V M ). These conditions are satis…ed in region HH of Figure 1 , which is drawn under the assumption that is negligible. Instead, when investments are complements but the investment cost is higher than
, we do not observe any norm. This happens in region N N of Figure 1 . In this region, since Lemmas 5, 6 and 8 (point b) are still true, we are sure that any equilibrium supporting a unique outcome belongs to the support of the limit distribution . This means that all investment pro…les and any distributional rule can be observed in the long run.
To see this consider region N N and suppose 15 that the only outcome observed is HH;
Since no high-low matches are observed, the beliefs on bargaining outcomes in high-low matches can drift. Because of said drift, all agents B (resp. A) might, for instance, deem that A (resp. B) will only accept a distribution granting her almost the whole pie at LH (resp. HL) pro…le even if all B (resp. A) are ready to accept any proposal at HL (resp. LH). Sure enough the drift does not shift the process from the equilibrium outcome HH;
: Suppose now that one agent B deems to capture a share V M at HL. According to this new belief she will play L in the next period. Therefore the initial equilibrium HH;
can be overturned when both populations update, once at the time, so that the process enters the basin of attraction of (LL; 0; 0) eventually. However this cannot be a social norm since a single mutation is enough to move the system into the basin of attraction of another equilibrium supporting a single outcome with a di¤erent investment pro…le (see Lemma 5, point (a), and Lemma 6). And so on and so forth.
We have also seen that DG is more appropriate for describing the evolution of investment and distribution norms when full rights of possession are socially protected. In this context, Proposition 11 ensures that norms always coevolve. This result is illustrated in Figure 2 , in which region N N of the previous Figure  1 disappears and is replaced by region HH. Therefore, region HH now coincides with the whole parameter space compatible with our main assumptions. Indeed, since in this case the only agent who has invested behaves as a dictator, any drift of beliefs does not upset the outcome HH;
even when condition 9 . However their Proposition 7 is only concerned with the evolution of investment norms instead of the coevolution of investment and bargaining norms. As we said, this stems from deep di¤erences between the two models and the evolutionary dynamics considered. In the preliminary version of the present paper we have also studied the model in which the surplus is equally split when both agents invest, as in Dawid and MacLeod (2001) , but an Ultimatum Game occurs when only one agent has invested. In this case Proposition 9 continues to be true. Lastly Proposition 9 continues to hold even when in the UG the agent who makes a proposal is not the agent who has chosen to invest, as in Ellingsen and Robles (2002) . 1 5 We remind that in region N N condition (6) does not hold. In both games, when social norms emerge, they support the e¢ cient investment pro…le and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus. The fact that the distributional norm is egalitarian is not a surprise since our model is symmetric. In turn this symmetry depends on the assumptions that investment costs are identical and that the surplus accrued when only one agent invests does not depend on the identity of the investing agent. One may then reasonably question whether an egalitarian norm could still be expected to emerge when some form of heterogeneity is allowed (Baker and Swope, 2005) . This is an important point since the literature on modern hunters-gatherers suggests that, in some cases, these societies endorse an egalitarian rule of distribution even when di¤erences in hunting-gathering abilities are observed (Kaplan and Hill, 1985; Woodburn, 1982) while in some other cases they do not (Hawkes, 1992). We have left this to further research.
Our results are derived under the natural assumption that full cooperation in the production stage is e¢ cient. We now brie ‡y provide some insights on its role; this allows us to evaluate a conjecture recently advanced by Alvard (2004) . In discussing the results of some experiments in …fteen small scale societies 16 , Alvard (2004) suggested that norms of cooperation and norms of fair division were likely to be observed in societies in which "the payo¤s to cooperation are (6) can no longer be satis…ed; as a consequence points (a) and (c) of Lemma 8 and Proposition 9 are not true. Therefore our results do not change. In DG the same social norms coevolve with and without the e¢ ciency hypothesis. In U G no norm evolves in the added region due to the failure of condition (6); consequently region N N enlarges: Both cases are illustrated in Figure 3 where the new parameter con…guration is represented by the triangle added on the right hand side of each panel.
Lastly, we speculate on the role played by bargaining in the evolution of social norms in U G and in DG under the e¢ ciency assumption. In order to do this, we apply the evolutionary framework to a simpler model in which a distributional norm already exists and agents only have to coordinate their investment decisions. To this end we consider the one shot game suggested by Hawkes (1992, payo¤ matrix 8). Let C denote this model. The resulting game is represented by the normal form (9) in which we assume 17 (i) that for whatever investment pro…le the pie is equally split 18 ; (ii) that the net surplus arising when both agents invest is the greatest one, and (iii) that the net surplus accruing when only one invests is not negative. The latter two conditions are satis…ed when c < min(
In this strategic framework, when there is more than one pure Nash equilibrium, the stochastically stable one coincides with the risk dominant equilibrium (Young, 1993a) .
From an anthropological perspective, this game is suitable to describe a situation arising when the pie to be distributed has to be produced in advance but, since property rights cannot be enforced 19 , it must always be split equally.
Few computations show that the game has either three Nash equilibria (two in pure strategies and one in mixed strategies) or only one pure symmetric Nash equilibrium. When the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, this is investment pro…le HH if c < min
and investment pro…le LL if c > max
. When the game admits two pure Nash equilibria, these are HH and LL if
and HL and LH if
When the game has two pure symmetric equilibria, the stochastic stability selects one of them. In particular, it selects investment pro…le HH if
. When instead the game has two pure asymmetric equilibria, LH and HL; both are stochastically stable.
These results are illustrated in Figure 4 , where HH (resp. LL) denotes the region in which investment pro…le HH (resp. LL) is the only stochastically stable equilibrium and where N N denotes the region in which no investment norms emerge since both equilibria, LH and HL, are stochastically stable. In this last game, a coordination failure arises when investment pro…le LL is the only stochastically stable equilibrium. Direct comparison of Figures 1 ( U G ) and 3 allows us to argue that the main consequences of modeling a bargaining 1 7 This game tallies with Hawkes's game under the assumptions V = V H and sV = V M : 1 8 This means that the distributional rule in C coincides with the unique distributional norm which can evolve in U G : 1 9 According to the anthropologist, this situation is compatible with societies admitting the so-called tolerated theft (Hawkes, 1992) . This means that sharing also occurs when the pie is only provided by one agent, since excluding outsiders is too costly. However, Bell (1995) argued that tolerated theft presumes that society ensures the hunter the full right to his or her catch, a condition that may not be granted. stage as a game is that the region supporting the worst outcome (LL) disappears while the region supporting the best outcome (HH) shrinks. Hence, the region in which no investment and bargaining norms evolve is enlarged. This highlights the fact that, contrary to what happens in C in which an egalitarian distributional norm is already established, when a distribution norm is allowed to evolve, its evolutionary process a¤ects the evolution of the investment norm (Hackett, 1993 (Hackett, , 1994 ).
When we do the same exercise for DG , we obtain a new game 0 C which di¤ers from C . This is because at the asymmetric investment pro…les, the whole surplus goes to the investing agent only. Under the structural assumptions of the paper, it turns out that H is now a dominant strategy and HH is the only Nash equilibrium. 20 Since C and 0 C essentially di¤er in the degree of property protection assured, we conclude that modeling a bargaining stage is crucial for understanding the evolution of both investment and distribution norms in societies in which full rights of possession are not socially supported. In societies in which full rights of possession are socially protected, this only explains which bargaining norm is brought to bear.
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Appendix
First of all we introduce some useful notations. Let us consider a state and suppose that all agents observe z ( ). In U G action L is not preferred to action H for agents i 2 A if
analogously, action L is not preferred to action H for agents i 2 B if
Here, by p A ( ) (resp. p B ( )) we denote the frequency of agent A (resp. B) who played H in , and by e y i HH ( ) (resp. e x i HH ( )) the expected payo¤s of agent i 2 A (resp. i 2 B) at the information set HH, given z ( ). This applies for the other information sets, too. Similar conditions hold for DG .
The following preliminary results are needed in order to prove Propositions 2 and 3. Lemma 12 and Lemma 14 are needed for both games ( U G and DG ); Lemma 13 is needed for U G only.
Lemma 12 Let x HH;1 < x HH;2 < ::: < x HH;k be the demands made by B at HH for some state . Then the set of best behavioral demands following HH for agents A is a subset of fV H x HH;l g k l=1 .
Proof. See Lemma A.1 in Ellingsen and Robles (2002).
Lemma 13 Consider U G and let be a limit set of ( ; P ) : If (HL; y HL ; x HL ) 2 ( ) (resp. (LH; y LH ; x LH ) 2 ( )) then:
(ii) (HL; y HL ; x HL ) (resp. (LH; y LH ; x LH )) is the only outcome which supports investment pro…le HL (resp. LH) in ( ) :
Proof. We only consider pro…le HL. The same holds true for LH. Point (i). Let be a state such that: (a) 2 ; (b) (HL; y HL ; x HL ) belongs to the support of z ( ) and x HL 6 = V M y HL . Let us suppose that only B agents update their characteristics: they will all accept y HL . For whatever belief regards the behavior of the opponents, this action is always a best reply. It is then impossible to return to the original state . This contradicts the assumption that 2 .
Point (ii). First we show that cannot include a state in which multiple demands are made at HL. Subsequently, we show that cannot include two di¤erent states supporting di¤erent outcomes following HL.
Let be a state such that: (a) 2 and (b) multiple demands are made by agents A at HL. We already know from point (i) that at all agents B accept all the demands made by their opponents. Suppose now that only agents A revise their characteristics. Afterward, any agent A will make the maximum demand observed at HL. Hence, it is impossible to return to the original state . This contradicts the assumption that 2 . Now let and 0 be two states such that: (a) both states belong to and (b) HL is observed. A single demand is made by A but y HL 0 > y HL ( ). Since it is impossible to return to then assumption 2 is contradicted. Lemma 14 Let be a limit set of ( ; P ) : If f(HH; y; x) ; (HH; y 0 ; x 0 )g 2 ( ) and either x 6 = x 0 or y 6 = y; then is a singleton and a self-con…rming equilibrium of :
Proof. Consider a set and let 2 be a state in which at least two demands have been observed in one population (i.e. B). Suppose that at least one of these demands (x ) is not a best reply to z ( ). Suppose also that, after observing z ( ) ; all agents who demanded x revise; as a consequence x disappears. A new state 2 is then reached in which pro…le HH is still observed. Suppose now that all A update; then, by Lemma 12, nobody will make demand fV H x g. These two demands have thus disappeared and it is impossible to return to the original state . This contradicts the assumption that 2 . Therefore, if multiple demands are made, each must be a best reply to z ( ) :
Now consider an agent belonging to population A who has played H in and suppose this agent has the incentive to change her investment should she know z ( ). When this agent updates, the distribution of the demands made by population A in subgame HH di¤ers from the original. This implies that at least one demand made by some opponents (i.e. B) is no longer a best reply when B updates. By applying the argument made in the paragraph above, we conclude that at least one pair of demands has disappeared and cannot reappear. This contradicts the assumption that 2 .
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that is not a singleton. We know from Lemmas 13 and 14 that, if a bargaining subgame is reached, only one of its terminal nodes is almost always observed.
First we show that ( ) must contain one outcome for every bargaining subgame. Of course ( ) must di¤er from f(HH; y HH ; V H y HH ) ; (LL; 0; 0)g : Suppose ( ) includes the following outcomes: (a) (HH; y HH ; x HH ) with y HH + x HH = V H ; (b) (HL; y HL ; x HL ) with y HL + x HL = V M : In a state in which both outcomes are observed must exist and it cannot be an equilibrium. We show that it is possible to reach either the basin of attraction of one equilibrium of the game, or a state in which all bargaining nodes are observed from . Suppose some agents B update. If x HH c > x HL then the updating agents will choose H so that, at the new state 0 , the frequency of this action in population B will increase:
If at least one agent A has beliefs e y i LH leading her not to prefer H to L when all agents B play H; then it is possible to reach a state in which all investment pro…les are realized from . This contradicts the assumption that ( ) = f(HH; y HH ; x HH ) ; (HL; y HL ; x HL )g. Otherwise, by letting all agents B update from it is likely to reach the basin of attraction of one equilibrium of the game supporting the outcome (HH; y HH ; x HH ). If x HH c x HL we reach the same conclusion by using a similar argument. It is simple to see that the same conclusion holds when ( ) includes any two di¤erent outcomes. Therefore if is a not a singleton, all the bargaining nodes are almost always visited meaning that ( ) includes four outcomes each of which is a subgame equilibrium.
We now have to show that the payo¤s must satisfy a well-de…ned set of constraints. Notice that a state 2 in which all the investment pro…les are observed must exist. Moreover when we allow all agents to update, all agents A will choose H:
and all agents B will choose H:
We can rewrite these conditions as
If all expressions are null, then is a singleton. Furthermore, when -for some populations -both expressions are either not negative or not positive, and at least one is not null, then the process can reach a new state from which is a self-con…rming equilibrium.
Consider the case in which both expressions are null for population A only. When B 1 is strictly positive and B 2 is strictly negative all Bs prefer H if p A ( ) > p A where:
Otherwise when B 1 is strictly negative and B 2 is strictly positive all Bs prefer H if p A ( ) < p A : In both cases, when all Bs agents update they will choose the same investment. Hence, a state which is an equilibrium of the game can be reached from .
A similar argument is applied when both expressions B 1 and B 2 are null. In this case, the threshold value of p B ( ) is p B which is now given by:
We are left with the case in which the product of the corresponding two expressions is strictly negative for each population. However, when A 1 and B 1 have the same sign the process can go into the basin of attraction of an equilibrium. Indeed, suppose that both A 1 and B 1 are strictly positive. This implies that all Bs prefer H if p A ( ) > p A and all As prefer H if p B ( ) > p B . Hence, for whatever values of p A ( ) and p B ( ) ; starting from the process can reach an equilibrium when one population revises at a time. The remaining possible case occurs when B 1 B 2 < 0 and A 1 A 2 < 0 but A 1 B 1 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
It follows by applying the same arguments as above and taking into account that y HL = x LH = V M holds at any limit set. In this case the conditions B 1 B 2 < 0, A 1 A 2 < 0 and A 1 B 1 < 0 can not be simultaneously met because both A 2 and B 2 are strictly positive. Consequently all limit sets are singleton. In addition an equilibrium of the game can only support outcome (LL; 0; 0) if it also supports at least one outcome following each investment pro…le.
Before giving the proof we brie ‡y review the concept of mutation connected set.
De…nition 15 Consider a union of limit sets X. This set is mutation connected if for all pairs , 0 2 X exists a sequence of limit sets ( 1 = ; 2 ; :::; n = 0 ) such that (a) for any k 2 f1; :::; n 1g ; k 2 X and (b) every transition from k to k+1 needs no more than one mutation.
Consider a limit set which does not support all information sets and suppose a single mutation occurs. If this mutation is a drift then the process reaches a new limit set 0 which di¤ers from only for some belief and/or action at some unreached information sets. Let ( ) be the set of equilibria which only di¤er from for some beliefs (and/or actions) held in some unreached information set. Sure enough the set ( ) is mutation connected. When is singleton, namely = f g, we use ( ) instead of ( ) :
Proof of Lemma 4
We give the detailed proof for U G . Then we suggest how to adapt it to DG : In this proof, when is an equilibrium and multiple demands are observed at HH, we denote the full ordered sets of demands made by B and A by fx HH;l g I) Consider an equilibrium in which only one pro…le is realized and multiple demands are made at HH pro…le. Let a single agent B switch from x HH;k to x HH;1 . Let all agents A update; then they will make a demand y HH;k = V H x HH;1 . Hence, we reach a new equilibrium 0 in which only HH is observed and only the two demands (V H x HH;1 ; x HH;1 ) occur. II) Suppose now that two pro…les are observed at the equilibrium . This implies that the same type of investment is made in one population . We give the proof only when HH and HL are observed. The other remaining cases are similar.
II.1) First, consider the case in which multiple demands are made following HH. Since is an equilibrium, the following conditions must always be met:
Consider an equilibrium 1 2 ( ) in which y HH;1 e y i LH ( 1 ) c > 0 for all As: When y HH;1 c > ; the population can get from to 1 2 ( ) through a sequence of single-mutations. At 1 let a single agent A mutate from y HH;k to y HH;1 and let all agents B revise; as a consequence they will all choose H and ask (V H y HH;1 ). Therefore, the process enters a new equilibrium 0 where 0 = fHH; y HH;1 ; V H y HH;1 g. Instead, when y HH;1 c , the inequality y HL c 0 must hold for all As: Suppose a single A mutates from y HH;k to y where y > y HH;k and let all agents B update: as a consequence they all will choose L. Therefore, by a sequence of single mutations the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 where 0 = fHL; y HL ; V M y HL g.
II.
2) Now consider the case in which a single demand is made following HH. When y HL c 0, the process can reach a new equilibrium 0 where 0 = fHL; y HL ; V M y HL g by letting a single agent A mutate from y HH;1 to y where y > y HH;1 and all agents B to revise. When instead y HL c < 0; then: (a) since point (c) of Assumption 1 holds, the subgame (HL; V M ) at is not reached; (b) y HH;1 e y i LH ( 1 ) c 0 for every A. By drifting, all agents B are led to accept the maximum feasible demand made by A in HL so that a new equilibrium 1 is reached. Sure enough, 1 2 ( ). Suppose now that a single agent A changes her demand from y HL to (V M ). When all agents A update, they observe that all Bs have accepted the demand (V M ) ; therefore, in HL their best response is y HL = V M . When all agents B update, they will choose H being x HL = : Hence, the process reaches equilibrium 0 where 0 = fHH; y HH;1 ; V H y H;1 g.
III)
Suppose now that all investment pro…les are observed at equilibrium . Since is an equilibrium the following conditions must be satis…ed:
where y HH;1 = V H x HH;k , y HL = V M x HL and y LH = V M x LH . We may rewrite these conditions as
We argue that when at least one of the expressions A . When all agents A revise, they will play H and will make a demand y HL = V M . Now let all agents B update. Since each agent B knows that x HL = and that all As have played H; then her best reply depends on the sign of (x HH;1 c). However, it is simple to see that for whatever value of (x HH;1 c), the process can reach a new equilibrium in which a smaller number of investment pro…les is realized. If, at this new equilibrium, two investment pro…les are realized, then the process can reach an equilibrium which supports a single outcome by a further sequence of single transition (see point II.2 above).
When both A 0 2 and B 0 2 are positive, a single mutation occurring in population A is enough to trigger a shift from to a new equilibrium 0 where:
In this case the mutation needed depends on how many demands are observed at HH. In particular:
(i) when multiple demands are made at HH; it is enough for one agent A to mutate from y HH;k to y HH;1 ;
(ii) when only one demand is made at HH it is enough for one agent A to mutate from H to L;
IV) The remaining case occurs when is not a singleton. Under the assumption (2) at least one of the following two subgames (LH; V M ) and (HL; V M ) is never reached. The same argument used above implies that the population can get from to 0 through a sequence of single-mutations.
Now consider game DG . Some of the arguments above continue to work with minor modi…cations. First of all, notice that y HL = x LH = V M in this case. Therefore, it follows that: (a) in case II) the set of investments pro…les supported by an equilibrium can either be fHH; HLg or fHH; LHg; (b) in case III) both A 
Proof of Lemma 5
Since in DG the set L is empty, the …rst point of the lemma hold only for U G .
(a) Let be an equilibrium belonging to L . From ; by a sequence of single mutations, the process reaches a new equilibrium 2 ( ) in which for every agent A and B it is true that: (i) e y i HH ( ) = V H x HH and (V H x HH ) > c+ ; (ii) at the subgame (LH; V M ) each agent A accepts (i.e. she chooses ); (iii)
: Suppose now that all agents A revise. Since (V H x HH ) > c + ; they will play H. Hence, the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 H where 0 = fHH; (V H x HH ) ; x HH g : (b) Consider U G and let be an equilibrium belonging to HL . At the pair of demands (y HL ; V M y HL ) is observed. Suppose that y HL < V M
. By drifting, all agents B are led to accept the maximum feasible demand made by A in HL and deem that all A make demand larger than (V H c + ) at HH: A new equilibrium 1 is thus reached. Sure enough, 1 2 ( ). Suppose now that a single agent A changes her demand from y HL to (V M ). When all agents A update, they observe that all Bs have accepted the demand (V M ) ; therefore, in HL their best response is y HL = V M . When all agents B update, since e x i HH ( 1 ) < c + holds for all Bs, they continue to play L. Hence, the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 HL where
; by a sequence of single mutations, the process can reach an equilibrium 2 0 in which all agents A have beliefs such that: (i) e y i HH ( ) = y HH ; (ii) e y i LH ( ) = ; (iii) + c < y HH < V H c . Suppose now, that an agent B mutates by playing H and making a demand (V H y HH ) in HH. Let all agents B revise; they will choose H and ask (V H y HH ). When agents A update, the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 H in which the pair of demands is (y HH ; V M y HH ). Of course, if y HL = V M then only the last sequence of mutations is required. The same argument holds true for DG with the caveat that any equilibrium belonging to HL supports the outcome (V M ; ) only.
Proof of Lemma 6
Let be an equilibrium belonging to L . From ; by a sequence of single mutations, the process can reach a new equilibrium 2 ( ) in which, for every agent A it is true that at the subgame (LH; V M y LH ) each agent A accepts (i.e. she chooses y LH ) and e y i HH ( ) y LH c < 0 but (V M y LH ) c > 0. Suppose now, that an agent B mutates by playing H and makes a demand V M y LH in LH. When all agents B update, they will choose H since population A has accepted demand V M y LH . Suppose now that all agents A revise. Since e y i HH ( ) y LH c < 0, they will continue to play L. Hence the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 LH in which the pair of demands is (y LH ; V M y LH ).
Proof of Lemma 8
Point (a). Consider some 2 IH and let fV H x; xg be the observed pair of demands. Note that IH is always well de…ned under condition (6) : We show that a single mutation transition is not enough to push the process into the basin of attraction of a di¤erent equilibrium which does not belong to IH :
I) First of all we show that a single mutation from H to L does not enable the process to enter the basin of attraction of a di¤erent equilibrium, even if each agent expects to receive: (i) the maximum payo¤ when she plays L but the opponent still plays H; (ii) the minimum payo¤ when she plays H but the opponent shifts to L. Let us consider this scenario and suppose that a B agent had switched from H to L and all agents A revised. This updating does not cause agents A to play L if
which can be rewritten as (16) holds by de…nition. Therefore no agent A will change her action after the revision. Similar argument can be applied to population B: Hence, a single mutation from H to L does not trigger a transition to a di¤erent equilibrium. II) We now show that a single mutation from x to x 0 (resp. from V H x to y 0 ) does not enable the process to enter the basin of attraction of a di¤erent equilibrium. Suppose each agent expects to get the maximum payo¤ when she plays L and the opponent chooses H. Let one agent B only change her demand to x 0 . Obviously, no agents B imitate the mutant when revising. Consider population A and allow them to update. By Lemma (12) their best response is either
c when she demands (V H x) and (V H x 0 ) c when she demands (V H x 0 ) : It is simple to see that under Assumption (3), the former payo¤ is greater than the latter. Hence, agents A will not change their demand when updating. Moreover, since (V H x)
, then updating will not cause agents A to play action L. If x 0 < x, agent A expects to get (V H x) c when she demands (V H x) and
. It is simple to see that under Assumption (3) the former payo¤ is greater than the latter. Hence, agents A will not change their demand when updating. Moreover, since (V H x) c > (V M ) ; then updating will not cause agents A to play action L. The case in which an agent A mutates from V H x to y 0 is symmetric. Hence, a single mutation from x to x 0 (resp. from V H x to y 0 ) does not trigger a transition to a di¤erent equilibrium.
Points I) and II) taken together say that, whatever single mutation we consider, this does not trigger a transition from 2 IH to a di¤erent equilibrium outside the set ( ). Indeed, the population returns to equilibrium 0 2 ( ) as soon as the mutating agent revises.
Point (b). Consider some 2 CH and let fV H x; xg be the observed pair of demands. We show that a single mutation transition is enough to enter the basin of attraction of an equilibrium 0 belonging to L . In order to fully describe the transition from to 0 , we have to take four cases into account : (1) x > x A ; (2) x = x A ; (3) x < x B ; (4) x = x B . Since cases (3) and (4) are symmetric to case (1) and case (2) respectively, we will give proof for these latter cases only.
Case (1): x > x A : At the following inequality must hold:
From the process can reach a new equilibrium At the following inequality must hold for agents A:
From , the process can reach a new equilibrium 1 2 ( ) by a sequence of single mutations, in which the following it is true for every agent:
Suppose an agent B mutates by demanding x 0 > x A at HH. When agents A update they will all choose L since, for whatever best action at HH, the expected payo¤ by playing H is now smaller than V M . When all agents B revise they will play L . The process then reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 L .
Point (c). Under condition (6) IH is well de…ned. By a direct application of previous point (b), along with point (e) of Lemma 5, it follows that from 2 CH it is possible to reach b 2 IH through a sequence of single mutations.
The following two Lemmas are needed for the proof of Proposition 9. In the text below we write x as shorthand for an equilibrium belonging to IH with (V H x; x) as distributional rule.
Lemma 16 Consider U G and let x 2 IH : The minimum number of mutations required to get from ( x ) to an equilibrium which supports a di¤ erent investment pro…le is:
where bse denotes the least integer greater than s when s is not an integer and (s + 1) is otherwise.
Proof. Suppose p 1 agents B mutate by playing L and p 2 agents B mutate by claiming x 0 > x A . For a given pair (p 1 ; p 2 ), agents A have the largest incentive to change into L if their beliefs are such that: (i) they expect to get the maximum payo¤ in an LH match ; (ii) they expect to obtain the minimum payo¤ in an HL match . Consider equilibrium e x 2 ( x ), in which the following applies for all agents:(i); e y i LH = V M and e y i HL = ; (ii) e x i LH = and in the subgame fHL; g all agents B accept. When at e x , some agents B mutate and these mutations induce all agents A to play L, then the process enters the basin of attraction of the equilibrium 0 2 L with positive probability. Sure enough after updating all agents A decide to play L if
where LHS is the expected payo¤ by playing L and RHS is the expected payo¤ by playing H. However, H e x ; p 1 ; p 2 depends on what the best demand in a match HH is. In particular
The minimum number of mutations in population B comes from the comparison between the solutions of two constrained minimization problems. In both problems, the objective function is p 1 +p 2 : In the …rst (resp. second) problem we contemplate the case in which the best action in HH is V H x 0 (resp. V H x).
Both problems require p 1 = 0 as a solution. Moreover, p
V H x is the solution to the …rst problem and p
is the solution to the second. Since p
; the minimum number of mutations in population B involves that: (i) mutating agents only change their demands in the HH pro…le; (ii) these mutations cause agent A to shift to action L when the best action in the HH match continues to be (V H x). Hence:
and
We now suppose that some agents A mutate. As before, two kinds of mutations must be considered: p 1 agents A mutate by playing L and p 2 agents A mutate by demanding (V H x 0 ) where x 0 < x B . In this case, we look for an equilibrium b x 2 ( x ) in which for all agents: (i) e x i LH = and e x i HL = V M ; (ii) e y i HL = and in the subgame fLH; g all agents A accept. It is easy to see that if some mutations of agents A occurs at b x and these mutations induce all agents B to play L; then the process enters the basin of attraction of equilibrium 0 2 L with positive probability. After updating, all agents B decide to play L if
where
Proceeding as before, the minimum number of mutations in population A is
By comparing (22) and (
Lemma 17 For su¢ ciently small, the minimum number of mutations needed to get from ( x ) to an equilibrium with the same investment pro…le but di¤ erent demands is: r
where r + B (x) is the number of mutations needed for the transition from ( x ) to ( x+ ) whereas r A (x) is the number of mutations needed for the transition from ( x ) to ( x ). Moreover, r + B (x) is a strictly increasing function of x and r A (x) is a strictly decreasing function of x.
Proof: By a direct application of Young (1993) .
Proof of Proposition 9
Before giving proof we will brie ‡y introduce the radius modi…ed coradius criterion (Ellison, 2000) . Let be a union of limit sets ( ) : Radius R ( ) is the minimum number of mutations needed to escape from the basin of attraction of and enter into the basin of attraction of another one with positive probability. Consider an arbitrary state = 2 and let (z 1 ; z 2 ; ::; z T ) be a path from to where 1 ; 2 ; :: r is the sequence of limit sets through which the path passes consecutively. Obviously i = 2 for i < r and r . Furthermore, it may be that a limit set can appear several times but not consecutively. The modi…ed cost of this path is de…ned by: c (z 1 ; :::; z T ) = c (z 1 ; ::; z T )
where c (z 1 ; ::; z T ) is the total number of mutations over the path ( ; z 1 ; z 2 ; ::; z T ). Let c ( ; ) be the minimal modi…ed cost for all paths from to . The modi…ed coradius of the basin of attraction of is then:
Theorem 2 of Ellison (2000) shows that every union of limit sets with R ( ) > CR ( ) encompasses all stochastically stable states.
From Lemmas 4, 5 and 8, points (b) and (c), we can deduce that for any = 2 IH the minimal modi…ed cost for all paths from to IH , is equal to one, whatever the number of limit sets the path goes through may be. Therefore, CR ( IH ) = 1. Since we know from point (a) of Lemma 8 that R ( IH ) > 1; by direct application of Ellison's result it follows that all stochastically stable states are included in IH .
In order to …nd the stochastically stable outcome, we need: (i) the radius of ( ), i.e. the smallest number of mutations required to destabilize the outcome supported by ; 8 2 IH ; (ii) to …nd an equilibrium belonging to IH such that R ( ( )) > CR ( ( )). All the details needed to compute R ( ( x )) for every x 2 [b x B ; b
x A ] are given by Lemmas 16 and 17: In particular, Lemma 16 provides the minimum number of mutations required to make a transition from 2 IH to 0 = 2 IH : Lemma 17 provides the minimum number of mutations required to make a transition from 2 IH to another equilibrium supporting the same investment pro…le HH, but a di¤erent distributional rule. Remember that for any x 2 [b x B ; b
x A ] it is always true that
Thus, from (28) and (29a) respectively we infer that:
For any x 2 [b x B ; b x A ] ; it follows from Lemma (16) and Lemma (17) that
Let x V H 2 and consider the set of equilibria ( x ). Let x 2 IH be an equilibrium. When x < x, then the minimal modi…ed cost from x to ( x ) is associated with the path x ! x+ ! ::: ! x ! ( x ) : Conversely, when x > x, the minimal modi…ed costs is associated with path x ! x ! :::
By the monotonicity of r + B (x) and r A (x) we obtain
it follows from Ellison (2000) that the only stochastically stable outcome is HH;
Proof of Lemma 10 Consider an equilibrium 2 H which satis…es condition (7). This implies that:
Suppose that an agent A (resp. B) mutates by drifting her belief at LH (resp. HL) to e y LH > V H x c (resp. e x HL > x c). Under this belief the mutant chooses L. This implies that pro…le LH (resp. HL) is reached. Then suppose all agents A (resp. B) revise. Since all agents B (resp. A) have claimed (V M ), then for all agents A (resp. B) we get e y i LH = (resp. e x i HL = ); hence all agents A (resp. B) choose to play H. The process then returns to an equilibrium 0 2 ( ). Suppose that a single mutation occurs from x to x 0 . Obviously no agent B imitates the mutant when updating. Allow all agents A to revise. By Lemma 12 their best response is either V H x or V H x 0 . When x 0 > x; agent A expects to receive (V H x) Since V H 2c > 0 by assumption, then it is always possible to detect a decreasing sequence of which satis…es condition (8) . This assures that the set D IH is always well-de…ned in DG . Moreover, since for all equilibria 2 D IH condition (7) is satis…ed, then Lemma (10) holds.
The following Lemma, which replaces Lemma 16, is needed for the proof of Proposition 11. As before, by x we denote an equilibrium belonging to where [s] denotes the least integer greater than s when s is not an integer and (s + 1) is otherwise.
Proof. We give proof for r B (x) only. Similar arguments can be used for r A (x). Consider x 2 IH . Suppose p 1 agents B mutate by playing L and p 2 agents B mutate by claiming x 0 > b x D A + ; let e x be the resulting state. Suppose these mutations induce all agents A to play L. With positive probability, the process enters the basin of attraction of equilibrium 0 2 LH only if updating does not induce all agents A to return to play H. By e y LH , we denote the expected payo¤ at LH of agents A, which is compatible with the assumption that x is an equilibrium. 21 Sure enough, at e x all agents A decide to play L if after updating N p 1 N e y LH > H e x ; p 1 ; p 2
where the LHS is the expected payo¤ by playing L and the RHS is the expected payo¤ by playing H. However, H e x ; p 1 ; p 2 depends on the best demand in an HH match. In particular M 2) . In both problems, the objective function is p 1 + p 2 : In M 1 (resp. M 2), we contemplate the case in which the best action at HH is V H x 0 (resp. V H x). Both problems require p 1 = 0 as a solution. Moreover, p (e y LH ) agents B claim x 0 > x. By updating, all agents A play L so that only pro…le LH is observed. Since all agents B claim V M then, after updating, all agents A learn that e y LH = . This implies that no agent A has the incentive to play H if ; the minimum number of mutations involves that: (i) mutating agents only change their demands in the HH pro…le; (ii) these mutations cause agent A to shift to action L when the best action in match HH continues to be (V H x) ;(iii) all agents A correctly anticipate the distribution occurring at LH: Hence:
Proof of Proposition 11
The proof proceeds along the lines previously used for U G with few modi…-cations. We know from Lemma 10 that, starting from 2 D IH ; more than one mutation is required in order to enter the basin of attraction of one equilibrium which does not belong to 
